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This article provides a briefhistorical perspective of thebeef hormone dispute be-
tween the European Union (EU) and
the United States and reviews the
scientific evidence of health risks
associated with products from
animals that have been admnistered
hormones.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the 1980s, the EU passed a set
of regulations prohibiting the admin-
istration of some natural and syn-
thetic growth hormones to farm
animals. The same regulations also
banned the marketing of domestic
and imported meat derived from
animals having received these types
of hormones.
In 1996, the EU updated the
regulations on hormones to pro-
hibit the marketing or importing of
meat products obtained from
animals having received hormonal
or thyrostastic action.  Included
were the six hormones that were
the subject of a trade dispute
between the EU and the United
States (joined by Canada).
The six hormones at issue were
oestradiol-17b, progesterone,
testosterone, which are all natural
substances, and trenbolone acetate,
zeranol, and melengestrol acetate
(MGA), which are synthetic. The
same regulations permitted EU-
member states (only) to use the
three natural hormones and other
substances with hormonal action
for medical and zootechnical
reasons.  Also, market meat from
animals that had been fed these
substances was permitted.
In 1996 the United States and
Canada brought separate but similar
complaints to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), claiming that
the EU regulations were in contradic-
tion with the principles of the WTO
agreements. In the summer of 1997, a
WTO panel assembled to resolve the
U.S. and Canadian disputes con-
cluded that the EU regulations were
inconsistent with some articles of the
Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, which
was signed by all WTO members in
Marrakech in 1994.
Specifically, the WTO panel
concluded that the EU regulations
were not based on risk assessment.
The regulations used arbitrary
distinctions in levels of sanitary
protection considered appropriate,
which resulted in trade restriction.
Furthermore, the inconsistency of
EU regulations with international
standards was not justified. The
panel recommended that the Dis-
pute Settlement Body ruling on the
dispute request the EU to bring its
regulations into conformity with the
SPS agreement.
In September 1997, the EU
initiated an appeal to the panel’s
conclusions as an appellant.  The
United States and Canada filed as
appelees. The EU contended that the
WTO panel erred in using the argu-
ment of inconsistency with interna-
tional standards because the
Agreement on SPS Measures does
explicitly recognize a country’s right
to set its own standards.
The EU also disagreed with the
panel on the burden of proof of the
lack of health effects of growth
hormones.  It claimed that the panel
had imposed its own assessment of
the scientific evidence and refused
the EU precautionary approach to
health risk, especially for cancer risk
related to the use of the hormone
MGA. The EU argued that the SPS
agreement allowed countries to
exceed international standards and
that harmonization to international
standards was not implied by the
agreement. Another argument cited
by the EU was the risk arising from
the lack of sound veterinary practice
and that the EU should have the
prerogative to assess if an exporting
member has sufficient veterinary
control measures to insure health
protection in the EU.
As an appelee, the United States
responded that the issue at stake
was not the way the risk assessment
had been conducted or how risk
averse the EU could be with a
precautionary stance. The issue was
rather that the EU had imposed the
trade ban without risk assessment.
Furthermore, the United States
An important question induced
by the hormone trade dispute is:
How safe are growth hormones?
Based on more than 30 years of
hormone use in the United
States, there is no evidence of
hormone residues in meat ex-
ceeding recommended stan-
dards, or of adverse human
health effects coming from this
process attribute of beef.
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argued that WTO agreements apply
to all regulations in member coun-
tries, including past regulations. The
appelate body reached a similar
conclusion to the original ruling,
although it corrected some conclu-
sions of the original panel. Accord-
ing to the appellate body, the EU ban
was inconsistent with WTO prin-
ciples, specifically with the SPS
agreement because it was not based
on risk assessment.
Following the appellate body
ruling, the EU filed for arbitration,
which is a last-resort means to
contest or soften a ruling. The
arbitrator had consultations in early
1998 and eventually ruled that the
reasonable period of time for the EU
to comply with the ruling of the
appellate body was 15 months from
the date of the ruling (February 28,
1998).  By then, the EU’s regulations
were to be consistent with the WTO
Agreement on SPS Measures. The
arbitrator rejected the latter request
because it was not prompt and not a
preferred way to eliminate the
inconsistency with the SPS agree-
ment relative to a simple withdrawal
of the EU regulation.
At the end of April 1999, the EU
announced it would not be able to
comply on time with the arbitrator’s
ruling and would consider offering
compensation. Now that the 15-
month period has expired, the United
States and Canada have been autho-
rized to impose punitive tariffs on
selected imports from the EU. In mid-
July, the United States announced it
would impose 100 percent duties on
$116.8 million of EU exports because
of th EU’s failure to comply with the
WTO ruling.
How well does the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement mechanism work?
First of all, resolution of the EU-U.S.
trade dispute took a long time.
Initiated in 1996, the beef dispute is
still not effectively resolved, and it
may still lead to a trade war between
the United States and the EU.
Many economists and policy
experts have criticized the aggres-
sive stance of the United States
when it attempts to open foreign
markets using section 301 of the
1974 U.S. trade law. Section 301 uses
the mercantilist stick of threats of
trade sanction to open foreign
markets, and until recently, it has
been considered a poor substitute
for the legal process of the dispute
settlement mechanism under the
WTO. Now it appears that the United
States and the EU may have reached
the same “threat game.” This is a
real test for the WTO, which has to
show it has teeth to the world
trading community to keep its
credibility. Assuming that the WTO
survives this EU-U.S. trade crisis on
hormone-fed beef, a bigger challenge
awaits the WTO with trade involving
genetically modified organisms.
PROTECTING CONSUMER INTEREST
Another issue raised by the
hormone dispute is the choice of
appropriate policy instrument to use
to intervene in markets and protect
consumer interest. Except for emer-
gency situations, economists tend to
dislike bans because they restrict
consumers’ quality choice. Some
consumers simply do not care about
the process attributes of products,
that is, the way they have been
produced. What policy options could
be considered beyond a ban on
hormone-fed animal products?
Labeling is a first option. Meat
could be labeled indicating the
process attributes of the meat, for
example, the type of feed and drugs
administered to the animal. Then the
market forces would determine a
price premium if enough consumers
valued “hormone-free” meat prod-
ucts higher than meat coming from
hormone-fed animals. Such a label-
ing scheme could be costly to
implement because it is difficult to
identify meat from animals that
received growth hormones. The
labeling scheme would require
identity through the food chain, i.e.,
tracking the animals at the farm and
monitoring the feeding process to
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insure that no hormonal additive has
been administered.
Another option would be to set
standards limiting hormone residues
in meat products to safe or precau-
tionary levels and to impose a ban
when the standards were violated.
Such standards are already defined
by an international institution, such
as the Codex Commission, which is
shielded from direct political influ-
ence. The latter instrument raises
the issue of harmonization of stan-
dards. Some countries may not
agree with international standards
as was the case with the EU. Harmo-
nization goes against the presump-
tion of most economists that
harmonization of standards among
heterogeneous trade partners with
different tastes is not optimal.
Hence, in practice, finding accept-
able standards may be difficult.
An important question induced
by the hormone trade dispute is:
How safe are growth hormones?
Based on more than 30 years of
hormone use in the United States,
there is no evidence of hormone
residues in meat exceeding recom-
mended standards, or of adverse
human health effects coming from
this process attribute of beef. For
most hormones, the absence of
health consequences hinges on
good veterinary and animal hus-
bandry practices in hormone use.
These good practices imply that
hormone residues are minimal and
correspond to naturally occurring
hormone residues levels present in
animal products. Hormones, both
natural and synthetic, tend to have
short half-lives, in the order of a few
days. This means their concentra-
tion decreases by half within a few
days and to nearly undetectable
levels within a few weeks. Deviations
from these good practices, such as
overdose, late injection, or improper
injection forms, can have adverse
health consequences. Hormones do
have health consequences and can
be carcinogenic at high dosages.
Hence, control and producer educa-
tion on appropriate procedures
appear to be essential components
of a well-functioning system. t
GMOs in Europe: A Genetically Modified Ordeal?
by Giancarlo Moschini
moschini@iastate.edu
515-294-5761
Jay Corrigan
corrigan@iastate.edu
515-294-6740
Continued on page 7
One thing seems certain: weare now familiar with yetanother acronym.  GMO
stands for genetically modified
organism and designates a living
entity (such as a bacterium, plant, or
animal) whose genome has been
modified by recombinant DNA
technology.  The ability to alter the
genetic makeup of organisms directly
by such methods (i.e., transgenic)
constitutes the hallmark of modern
biotechnology and has ushered in a
new era in agricultural research.
The promises of biotechnology in
agriculture have at last begun to be
realized, and in recent years an
increasing stream of transgenic
plants have been approved and
marketed mostly (but not only) in the
United States.  Two such crops now
well known to midwestern farmers
are Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans
and Bt corn.   For RR crops, the
relevant genetic material comes from
a particular strain of Agrobacterium
that, once introduced into the plant,
confers resistance to glyphosate
herbicide.  For Bt crops, the genetic
material of interest comes from
another bacterium, Bacillus
thuringiensis; once inserted into
maize, it confers to the plant the
ability to kill the European corn borer.
ACCEPTANCE OF GMOS
The GMOs, by and large, have
been welcomed by U.S. agriculture
and by a number of other countries
(notably Canada and Argentina).
These new crops were virtually
unknown before 1996 but have
experienced breathtaking adoption
rates.  For example, in 1999 more
than 50 percent of the soybean crop
grown in the United States is geneti-
cally modified (at least 40 percent of
U.S. corn and about 40 percent of
U.S. cotton are also transgenic).  For
the next crop year it is estimated
that 100 percent of the soybeans
grown in Argentina will be herbicide
resistant.  But GMOs have struck a
different cord in Europe, where they
have met with numerous obstacles
from consumers, businesses,
policymakers, and regulators.
Safe food is at issue.  Transfer-
ring genetic material from one
organism to a completely different
one is perceived by some as unnatu-
ral, and it is feared that the presence
of a foreign genetic code may induce
the transformed organism to pro-
duce unwanted toxins and allergens.
The absence of risk from eating such
food, it is claimed, has not been
adequately documented.
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Iowa’s Agricultural Situation
by Phil Kaus
pkaus@card.card.iastate.edu
515-294-6175
Continued on page 6
Do you remember last October’s Farm Disaster Relief Billtotaling $5.6 billion, of which more than $2 billion wereallocated for single-year and multi-year disaster relief?
According to U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, the
long-awaited checks are in the mail.
Producers will be paid 84.9 percent of qualifying single-
or multi-year loss.  Producers who claimed both single-year
and multi-year losses will receive the larger amount of
eligible losses but not both.  Talks of another congressional
aid package to producers fizzled in May as Congress decided
to take a “wait and see” approach.  There was agreement that
assistance was needed, but some wanted more time to assess
that need, especially given the fact that the October aid had
not yet reached farmers.
CROPS
The average monthly price of corn received by Iowa
producers has now been below $2 per bushel for 11 months
straight.  The last run of below $2 corn this decade was during
the 1992/93 marketing year, when there was a run of five
months below $2.  For the week ending May 30, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture’s (USDA) Crop Progress report suggested
planting and crop conditions in Iowa were back to normal after
fields received abundant moisture during April and early May.
The latest U.S. production estimates from the USDA are for a
9.65 billion bushel crop.  The USDA is projecting global ending
stocks to increase.  Use is also projected to increase, only not
as fast.  The world stocks-to-use ratio is projected to increase
to 18.44 percent, see table on page 5.  This indicates that  any
sustained recovery in price will be slow in coming unless
production estimates decrease or demand increases.
For soybeans, you have to go back to 1987 to find a similar
run of monthly prices below $5 per bushel. World production
and use is projected to increase this year, but a drop in exports
will increase ending stocks by about 3.0 million metric ton
(mmt).  This causes the stocks-to-use ratio to increase to 17.77
percent.  USDA’s Crop Progress report for the week ending
July 12 reported 77 percent of the crop was rated good to
excellent. This has led to recent central Iowa elevator bids
in the $3.75 per bushel range.
LIVESTOCK
Pork prices recovered nicely in May and seemed to hold
their own in June giving producers some optimism. However,
this optimism was quickly squelched with the June 1 Hogs and
Pigs Report. U.S. hog inventory was down 3 percent from June
1998, but 1 percent above March 1, 1999. Most analysts were
expecting to see a 6 to 7 percent decline in inventory from
June 1998. The liquidation the industry hoped for didn’t
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World Stocks-to-Use Ratios
Iowa Cash Receipts
Jan.–March 1999
1999 1998 1997
       (Million Dollars)
Crops 1,522 1,847 2,305
Livestock 1,142 1,246 1,286
Total 2,664 3,093 3,590
            Crop Year
1999/00 1998/99 1997/98
   May
                         Projection Estimate
                                                (Percent)
Corn 18.45 16.95  14.90
Soybeans 17.77 16.07 14.42
Wheat 20.00 23.11 23.81
June* May April
1999 1999 1998
              ($/Bushel)
Corn 1.86 1.95 2.15
Soybeans 0.00 4.35 5.91
Oats 1.35 1.36 1.54
                  ($/Ton)
Alfalfa 73.00 74.00 93.00
All Hay 72.00 73.00 92.00
                 ($/Cwt.)
Steers & Heifers 65.90 64.10 60.20
Feeder Calves 81.70 82.00 80.80
Cows 37.70 38.20 37.00
Barrows & Gilts 34.60 38.90 44.90
Sows 24.20 26.00 32.40
Sheep† 33.20 34.50 24.70
Lambs† 74.60 61.00 88.00
                   ($/Lb.)
Turkeys 0.37 0.37 0.37
                 ($/Dozen)
Eggs 0.26 0.25 0.34
                  ($/Cwt.)
All Milk 12.20 12.90 13.60
*Mid-month †estimate
Average Farm Prices Received
by Iowa Farmers
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materialize, consequently the
bearish report indicates highs for
the year may have been estab-
lished. Third quarter prices should
average between $30 and $35 per
hundredweight and fourth quarter
prices in the upper $20 range per
hundredweight.
Although slaughter numbers
through May were 2 percent greater
than last year, pork production has
increased 3 percent because of
higher slaughter weights, in part
due to the low cost of feed ingredi-
ents.  A moderate growth in de-
mand and the recent gains in the
export market have not been
enough to offset the larger produc-
tion, which has resulted in notice-
able increases in cold storage
stocks. This could further depress
prices in the fourth quarter when
slaughter numbers are expected to
again top the 2 million head per
week level (see article on pp.0-10).
For the last week in June, Texas-
Oklahoma Slaughter Steers were
trading in the mid-$60 per hundred-
weight range.  The mid-month price
received by Iowa producers for steers
and heifers was $65.90 per hundred-
weight.  The latest cattle-on-feed
report suggests placements had
slowed compared to placements
during the first quarter.  First quarter
placements were more than 20
percent above 1998 levels and slowed
to less than 1 percent above in May.
Packer demand in May was
strong, and it appears that feeders
continued to market cattle aggres-
sively through May.  Dressed
weights have declined as feeders
moved showlist up in order to take
advantage of the packer demand.
Cattle feeders have been in the
black since February and want to
take advantage while they can in
the face of large slaughter-ready
cattle coming to market later this
summer.  Feed costs will continue
to be low, but hopefully they will
not be a signal to hold cattle back
this summer.  After the summer
run, feeder and fed markets are
expected to show some strength.t
Iowa’s Ag. Situation
Continued from page 4
Being on the cutting edge ofagricultural public policy isone of things that Assistant
Director Keith Heffernan enjoys most
about his association with the Center
for Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment (CARD).
“In general, there are a lot of
changes and repositioning taking
place in agriculture, which can be
threatening to the industry.  CARD has
to keep ahead of the trends, and our
work has to be relevant to current and
future agriculture,” Keith said.
The Midwest Feeds Consortium
is one example of this forward-
thinking approach.  Keith worked
with researchers at CARD and other
entities to look at the feasibility of
using soybean oil meal in fish rations.
This research identified a new
opportunity for U.S. soybean growers
and processors.  (For more informa-
tion about the consortium’s findings,
please see the Spring 1999 issue of
Iowa Ag Review, vol. 5, no. 2., avail-
able online at http://
www.card.iastate.edu)
Keith is also working with
AgSTATE (Agricultural Strategic
Thinkers Acting Together Effectively)
Meet the Staff
Keith Heffernan
to develop a strategic plan for Iowa
agriculture.  He and Department of
Economics Chair John Miranowski
facilitate the group, which is com-
posed of people representing farm
and commodity organizations,
agribusinesses, state government,
and ISU.  CARD’s role is to help
identify resources for the group and
to help AgSTATE to develop its vision
for agriculture, Keith said.
A graduate of ISU, Keith has
worked at CARD for almost 5 years.
Prior to coming to CARD, he was
the director of public affairs for the
Iowa Farm Bureau Federation,
worked on former governor Terry
Brandstad’s staff, and served as the
executive director for the Iowa
Corn Growers Association.
“My entire career has involved the
development and implementation of
agricultural policy, and before coming
to CARD, most of the work I did was on
the implementation side.  At CARD, I
have the opportunity to work more on
the development side, and here we are
able to do the necessary research to
determine the best solution for the
problems and challenges facing
agriculture,” he said.
In addition to his responsibilities
at CARD, Keith serves on the Terrace
Hill Commission, the Farm Founda-
tion Roundtable, and as board
president of the FarmHouse Alumni
Association.  He is married to wife
Alexa, and they have two children,
Andy, an ISU graduate who lives and
works in the Seattle, Wash., area, and
Kim, a sophomore at the University
of Northern Iowa. t
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GMOs in Europe
Continued from page 3
The environment is another
concern.  It is feared that the herbi-
cide- and insect-resistant traits of new
crops may spread to other plants in
the wild; that genetically modified
plants may be deleterious to other
species (as in the recent debate on
whether or not Bt corn harms the
larval stage of monarch butterflies);
and that specific genetic sequences
conferring antibiotic resistance,
which are used as “markers” in the
genetic engineering process, may
unwittingly aid the development of
antibiotic resistant germs that could
eventually harm humans.
An array of related issues are
championed by particular segments
of the European public.  Some, for
instance, perceive the whole idea of
transferring genetic material be-
tween different organisms as unethi-
cal.  Others question whether
private research and development
activities in a rapidly consolidating
biotechnology sector is concentrat-
ing too much power in the hands of a
very few multinational companies.
GMO REGULATION IN EUROPE
The novelty of GMOs has re-
quired the introduction of specific
regulations in most countries.  The
United States has chosen to rely
heavily on existing regulatory tools,
with limited specific adaptations that
entail a role for three separate federal
agencies that enjoy widespread
public confidence (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and Food and Drug
Administration).  The European
Union (EU), with a unique institu-
tional setting, has chosen to rely
more on new legislation.
The EU is not a country; it is the
collection of 15 (rather different)
countries united in the pursuit (not
yet fully realized) of political and
economic union.  Regulatory activi-
ties in the EU are seen as the domain
of politicians as much as bureau-
crats.  Both European bureaucrats
and politicians, it must be said, have
a less-than-spotless record in such
matters, as evidenced by the recent
debacles associated with the British
“mad cow” disease and this year’s
Belgian dioxin scare.  As a conse-
quence, European consumers have
developed skepticism about what
they are told is safe to eat, and
policymakers have read into that a
need for more action on the regula-
tory front.  Be that as it may, the
legislative underpinning of the EU
regulation of GMOs has two pillars:
the 1990 Directive on the deliberate
release of GMOs into the environ-
ment (Directive 90/220/EEC), and
the 1997 legislation concerning
novel foods (Regulation 258/97/EC).
A Complicated Process
The 1990 Directive constitutes
the backbone of EU legislation
concerning GMOs.  Its purpose is to
protect human health and the
environment when releasing GMOs
or placing them on the market.
While it was intended to work
somewhat like the U.S. system, this
legislation also reflects the peculiar
institutional structure of the EU.
The complex regulatory procedure
starts by requiring anyone wishing
to release or market a GMO to
“notify” the competent authority of
any one EU country by supplying a
host of documentation (including a
risk assessment).  This country (the
rapporteur) should provide an initial
evaluation within 90 days.
If the rapporteur supports the
GMO, the dossier is forwarded to the
European Commission (effectively,
the executive government of the
EU), which, after considerations of
its own, sends it to the competent
authorities of each of the other EU
countries.  These countries have 60
days to evaluate and respond.  If the
Commission receives no objection,
it informs the rapporteur country,
which can then proceed by issuing
the final written authorization.
If any one country objects,
however, the matter must be re-
solved following a protocol specified
in the Directive itself, which entails a
role for the Commission, a role for a
standing EU committee, and a role
for the EU Council of Ministers (the
chief EU decision body for legisla-
tive and political matters).  Once a
decision is made it is binding for all
member countries.  Still, under the
authority of the Directive (article
16), individual countries can provi-
sionally prohibit marketing of an
approved GMO on their territory
citing possible risk to human health
and the environment.
Because the 1990 Directive did
not apply to nonliving substances
extracted from GMOs, the EU devel-
oped additional legislation to regu-
late food produced from GMOs. The
1997 Regulation identifies a “novel
food” as one not previously con-
sumed to a significant degree within
the EU. Specifically, the 1997 Regula-
tion applies to food containing or
consisting of GMOs, and foods
produced from but not containing
GMOs. Because RR soybeans and Bt
corn were already commercialized in
the EU prior to the introduction of
this Regulation (under the authority
of the 1990 Directive), ad hoc legisla-
tion was required to extend the
definition of “novel food” to products
of these genetically modified crops
as well (Regulation 1139/98).
The 1997 novel foods regulation
establishes a mondatory EU-wide
pre-market approval for all foods
obtained from GMOs and it man-
dates “labeling” of novel foods and
novel food ingredients. Specifically,
consumers should be informed
when a food contins GMOs. This
lavelling feature is highly controver-
Regulatory activities in the
EU are seen as the domain
of politicians as much as
bureaucrats.
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sial and sets EU regulation apart
from that of the United States (where
no mandatory labeling of foods
obtained from GMOs exists).
AN AMBIGUOUS PROCESS
While the EU regulatory struc-
ture for GMOs is ambitious in scope,
it is fraught with ambiguities and
loopholes.  The timelines laid down
in the Directive and the Regulation
are often violated.  Article 16 of the
Directive has been abused by some
countries to provide indefinite
restrictions on EU-approved GMOs
(Austria and Luxembourg).  In
certain instances, rapporteur coun-
tries have withheld issuing the final
written authorization even after all
approval hurdles had been cleared
(France). As a result, only a handful
of GMOs have so far been approved
in the EU (they include Novartis’ Bt
corn, Monsanto’s RR soybeans and
Bt corn, and AgrEvo’s LibertyLink
corn, but exclude many other
transformation events already
approved and used in U.S. crop
production).
With public concerns about
GMOs munting, the system has
effectively stalled. Indeed, no new
GMO crop has been approved in the
EU for more than ayear; and at their
June 1999 meeting, the EU council of
(Environmental) Ministers appeared
to agree on continuing this de facto
moratorium on new approvals.
The strict labeling requirements
are also somewhat empty at present.
For example, it ha yet not been
decided what exactly it means for a
food to be “free” of GMOs (i.e.,
critical threshold levels need to be
agreed on), and testing methods to
monitor a label’s claims concerning
GMOs have not been specified.
Efforts to integrate and stream-
line EU legislation on GMOs have
been held back by the mass resigna-
tion of the Commission in March
1999. The new, recently appointed
Commission, and they newly elected
European Parliament (yet another
EU institution, which shares legisla-
tive power with the Council), will
have their hands full in sorting out
the problems under the watchful
eyes of a somewhat confused, but
increasingly dissatisfied, public.
Given the situation, little substantial
progress may be expected in the
near future. For example, in light of
the current de facto moratorium on
using the 1990 Directive, approval
of new GMO crops may be delayed
as far out as 2002.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
In a world where talk of global
markets is commonplace, it comes
as no surprise that the European
struggle to sort out its position on
GMOs has implications for U.S.
agriculture.  Delay in approving new
GMO crops in Europe means lower
than expected revenue for U.S. life
science multinationals that are at
the forefront of new crop develop-
ment.  On the other hand, from the
producer’s point of view, this delay
per se is penalizing EU farmers by
hampering their competitive posi-
tion (compared with U.S. and
Argentine farmers).
The EU labeling laws, however,
may hold perhaps the most serious
implications for U.S. agriculture.
Some believe that food labeled as
containing GMOs will be less
appealing to European consumers,
and in fact many EU retailers have
undertaken to supply what consum-
ers apparantly want: GMO-free food.
Some food chaines and retailers
have gone further by rpomising to
shun foods and food ingredients
containing GMOs. If these trends
are sustained, they would create
incentives to develop handling and
processing systems characterized
by “identity preservation.”
This point was brought home
suddenly a few months ago when
major U.S. commodity handlers
(including Archer Daniels Midland
and Cargill) announced that they
would not buy maize produced with
GMO varieties not yet approved for
importation in the EU. Keeping GMO
crops and food separated from their
traditional counterparts at every
stage of the production and market-
ing chain will be a costly undertak-
ing, which may eventually be
reflected in a price “premium” for
GMO-free commodities (or a “dis-
count” for GMO commodities).
Given the trade implications of
the EU regulation of GMOs, there is
considerable concern in the United
States, where the export sector is
vital to the marketing of all major
crops.   Some U.S. officials are
complaining loudly that the EU
labeling law constitutes an inad-
missible technical barrier to trade,
and have threatened to take the
matter up within the World Trade
Organization.  Whereas such an
attitude is understandable, it
oversimplifies the issues. It would
appear that European consumers’
concerns are genuine, and that the
preoccupation of EU policymakers
is to address those concerns
(rather that to exploit them for
protectionist purposes).
If a GMO trade war were to break
out, it would dwarf the recent
banana and beef-hormone confronta-
tions between the EU and the United
States.  The June 1999 meeting of the
G8 group of industrialized countries
considered the matter, and bought
some time by charging the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development with providing advice
on the global implications of GMO
foods and crops.   In the meantime,
a serious campaign of scientifically
based education aimed at consum-
ers and the general public that
emphasizes facts and eschews
rhetoric is overdue on both sides of
the Atlantic. t
. . . in light of the current
de facto moratorium on using
the 1999 Directive, approval
of new GMO crops may be
delayed as far out as 2002.
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The fourth quarter of 1998 wasone that Iowa pork producerswould prefer to forget. From
favorable farm prices in the $50 per
hundredweight range just in the past
year, prices fell below $30 per
hundredweight in the beginning of
September, slid below $20 per
hundredweight by the middle of
October, and declined even further,
to below $15 per hundredweight in
December.  This left many asking
why and wondering whether low hog
prices are here to stay. Let’s look at
how demand and supply factors
affected the industry throughout
1998.  Are the resulting impacts
transient or permanent?
RETAIL DEMAND
Retail demand remained strong
in 1998.  James Mintert, a Kansas
State University agricultural econo-
mist, suggests that retail demand in
1998 was actually 3 percent higher
than the 1990 base year. This is
actually the first increase in demand
relative to the base year in a decade.
FAPRI (Food and Agricultural Policy
Research Institute) researchers
showed that this higher overall
demand was mostly due to retail
activity in the fourth quarter (see
Figure 1).  There is reason to believe
that, in the long run, the pork sector
can continue to increase total
demand at least at the rate of
population growth, which is 0.85
percent annually.
Foreign demand played a small
role in the 1998 story; nonetheless,
the live animal and meat trade
contributed to depressing prices
slightly (.31 percent) because meat
net exports were offset by live hog
net imports flowing to U.S. packers
Record Low Pork Prices in 1998: Transient or Permanent?
by Jacinto Fabiosa
jfabios@card.card.iastate.edu
515-294-6183
Phil Kaus
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515-294-6175
from Canada.  Even with the Asian
and Russian macroeconomic crises,
U.S. pork exports in 1998 rose 17.1
percent over the previous year.
Exports to Japan increased by 7
percent, while exports to the
Russian Federation increased by
52.9 percent.
If retail demand was increasing,
and the United States’ net position
in foreign trade was not a major
factor, what drove farm prices to
record lows?  It is the supply side,
or the live hog demand, that pro-
vides the answer.
PORK SUPPLY AND LIVE ANIMAL
DEMAND
When measured by the sow
level, the size of the pork industry in
1998 was not significantly larger
than in 1990.  There were 47,000
more sows in the 6.89 million inven-
tory, a 0.68 percent increase.  But the
improvement in productivity
through normal technological
change has been very significant
over the last decade, pushing an
ever-larger supply into the market.
In 1998, a sow produced 2.1
more piglets compared to 1990, and
slaughter-ready barrows and gilts
weighed 15 pounds more in
liveweight. The increase in pork
supply attributable to normal
technological change exerts a
downward pressure on price of
approximately 15 percent every
year, even if the industry is not
expanding its sow level.  Although
this technological advancement
gives U.S. pork its competitive
advantage to expand traditional
markets and penetrate new emerg-
ing markets, technology also com-
pounds the impacts of adverse
shocks in the world market and,
thereby, can be an unwitting con-
tributor to depressing farm prices.
The U.S. pork industry has
experienced a structural transforma-
tion, with pork production becoming
more commercialized.  On the one
hand, this has led to significant
technological improvements and, on
the other, may have brought about a
degree of inflexibility in adjusting
supply to unfavorable price move-
ments.
In the 1950s, there were 20 pigs
per pork operation compared to the
current number of 534 pigs.  Today,
pork operations with 2,000 or more
hogs represent only 6 percent of the
operations, but account for 64 per-
cent of the inventory  (with opera-
tions that market 5,000 head or more
accounting for 42 percent).  Despite
prices falling below $30 per hundred-
weight as early as September 1998,
Figure 1.  Retail Pork & Live Hog Demand Indices,  Average 1998=100
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sow levels in the fourth quarter of
1998 declined by only 1.19 percent
compared to the third quarter, and
were .248 percent higher than for the
same period in 1997.
In commercial production,
producers spread their more sub-
stantial fixed costs over a larger
scale of production.  They only need
to cover variable costs to stay in
production, and are not likely to exit
the industry because they would
face proportionately big losses in
“sunk” (unrecoverable fixed) costs.
  The longer planning horizon
common among larger operations
allows them to absorb adverse short-
term price shocks. They can lock in
better prices in the futures market
and obtain the best, quality-based
prices for their more standardized
animals (avoiding weight and car-
cass variability penalties). A recent
Iowa State University study by John
Lawrence, Glen Grimes, and Marvin
Hayenga reports that slightly less
than half of the hogs sold in 1998
were marketed through some form of
contract that provided producers
with a degree of protection from
unfavorable price movements.
PACKING PLANT CAPACITY
Record low hog prices in the last
quarter of 1998 are attributable to a
decrease in the demand for live hogs
due to a significant decrease in
packer capacity. The 10.4 percent
increase in the hog supply in 1998
should have brought just a 15.08
percent decline in the farm price
from the 1997 average of $53 per
hundredweight. Instead, prices fell
by an alarming 35.5 percent. The
culprit, as it turned out, was a rather
sudden 8.29 percent drop in process-
ing capacity—and the corresponding
increases in cost of production at the
packing plants. Accelerated plant
operating and labor costs tended to
depress farm prices.
Larger than normal numbers of
live hogs were pushed onto the
market at a time when several U.S.
packing plants were closing or
reducing capacity because of
environmental and food safety
regulations (e.g., Apple Valley
plant in Michigan and Dakota Pork
plant in South Dakota closed; and
Smithfield in North Carolina
reduced capacity).  Another com-
pounding factor was an unex-
pected influx of Canadian hogs
into U.S. packing plants.*  Begin-
ning the week of September 18,
1998, weekly slaughter exceeded
the 2 million head capacity for all
but three remaining weeks of the
year, and weekend slaughter
exceeded 160,000 head for all but
two weekends.
WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR THE HOG
INDUSTRY
The high quantity of stocks in
cold storage suggests that conse-
quences of the 1998 phenomenon
may carry over into 1999.  Prior to
November 1998, cold storage stocks
were being depleted. However, in
recent months stocks have been
increasing at an alarming pace.  In
the U.S. Department of Agriculture
June 1999 Cold Storage report,
frozen pork stocks were up 23
percent from last year, and stocks of
frozen pork bellies were 82 percent
above last year’s levels.
Although decent prices were
reported in April and May this
year, they have since declined into
the low $30 per hundredweight
range.  However, prices are not
expected to fall any lower than
that of the last quarter of 1998.
This is because of the 6 percent
decline in breeding herd numbers
(reported in the March and June
1999 Hogs and Pigs reports),
returning growth in pork exports,
and a decline in live hog imports.
The answer to the question
posed at the beginning of this article
is that both transient and perma-
nent demand and supply factors
shaped the pork price outcome of
1998.  With technological improve-
ments and structural transformation
continuing in the pork industry over
the long term, appropriate process-
ing capacity strategies might help in
the short term.
In the long run, the pork industry
needs to make adjustments to
balance domestic supply and
demand. Moreover, an aggressive
export promotion effort offers the
best option in permanently relieving
the downward pressure on domestic
prices.  As the economies of the
United States’ traditional markets
recover (e.g., Japan), and as emerg-
ing markets open (e.g., Taiwan’s
membership in World Trade Organi-
zation [WTO] and Russia), U.S. pork
products should gain shares in
traditional markets and access to
emerging markets.
The United States should remain
vigilant during the upcoming WTO
negotiations in not allowing protec-
tionist policies to emerge under the
guise of phytosanitary consider-
ations, while taking a proactive
position regarding legitimate
phytosanitary issues raised by its
trading partners.   t
*Labor problems in Canada caused the
shutdown of one of their packing
facilities, sending asudden flow of live
hogs to the United States.
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